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bers of the EU. Special focus is given to the more signifi cant role these countries began to play in 
global value chains (GVCs) as a result of liberalisation processes and integration within the EU. In 
addition, the article evaluates their place in global vertical specialisation. To locate each country on 
a global value chain and to compare them with selected countries, more complex methods of meas-
uring the level of participation of European post-socialist countries in GVCs were employed. These 
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concluded that (a) post-socialist countries differ in the levels of their participation in GVCs. Coun-
tries that have stronger links with Western European countries, especially with Germany, are more 
integrated; (b) a large share of post-socialist countries’ exports pass through Western European 
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production rather than upstream markets. 
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INTRODUCTION
The collapse of the communist system and the disintegration of the USSR were 
followed by transitional recession in the post-socialist countries of Europe. Its 
main sources lay in wide-ranging reforms to the economic system such as the 
transition from a producers’ market toward a consumers’ market, the transfor-
mation of the structure of post-socialist economies, the modernisation of their 
obsolete financial systems, the imposition of financial discipline, and attempts 
at improving general economic efficiency (Kornai 1994). Aimed at fixing flaws 
inherited from the past, the reforms placed post-socialist countries in a new geo-
political and international context, particularly regarding trade and capital rela-
tions. At the same time, the development goals pursued from the 1990s were 
becoming increasingly similar. Democratisation, integration with the European 
Union (EU), the strengthening of bilateral and multilateral political and economic 
relations, and the modernisation of financial sectors, particularly of banking sys-
tems (Baszyński 2013), were common elements of their long-term development 
strategies. The methods and tools they used to attain their goals were different 
though (Ananicz – Sadowski 2012). 
One of the key changes in the economic policy of post-socialist countries was 
the redirection of their foreign trade towards Western Europe and the introduc-
tion of market mechanisms into their international trade (Środa-Murawska 2007; 
Maćkowiak 2011). The liberalisation of foreign trade in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope (CEE) quickly led to the formation of new trade rules in the region (Cieślik 
2014a). 
In countries other than the most developed, the liberalisation of foreign trade 
did not necessarily contribute to faster social and economic development (Ry-
narzewski 2013), but in the case of post-socialist countries it did. An analysis of 
trends in the geographical and commodity patterns of foreign trade in European 
post-socialist countries shows major changes. More and more often, exports of 
labour- and raw material-intensive products are replaced by capital-intensive and 
high-tech ones. As a result, the foreign trade patterns observed in post-socialist 
countries are increasingly similar to those in the EU-15. The growing integration 
between post-socialist countries and the EU makes the CEE region increasingly 
attractive to foreign investors. Their investments significantly contribute to the 
competitiveness of trade, as well as accounting for a large proportion of their 
foreign trade.
The aim of this article is to analyse changes in the commodities foreign trade in 
the new member states (EU-10), i.e. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hun-
gary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, and the role 
these states play in global value chains as a result of liberalisation and integration 
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with the EU. The analysis spans the years 2000–2009. To ensure consistency and 
comparability of results, the data sources were databases kept by international 
organisations (OECD, and WTO).
1. EUROPEAN POST-SOCIALIST COUNTRIES AND THEIR ROLE IN 
GLOBAL PRODUCTION NETWORKS: A BRIEF LITERATURE REVIEW
The post-socialist countries are heavily involved in the process of global produc-
tion, especially within Europe. Smaller countries like all CEE nations are not able 
to produce all the inputs themselves and thus tend to be more vertically integrated 
(Stehrer et al. 2012). A growing strand of recent research is devoted to analyses 
of the fragmentation of production and its impact on post-socialist countries and 
their industries. Much empirical research demonstrates the close and dynamic 
integration of the CEE region with the EU market (especially the euro area). 
Research by the IMF (2011) proved this thesis and highlighted that exporters 
from European post-socialist countries involved in value networks were often 
owned outright by EU companies or operated as joint ventures of euro area com-
panies. Dobrinsky (1995) highlighted the fact that post-socialist countries were 
more specialised in the labour-intensive and resource-intensive sectors of manu-
facturing by using their comparative advantages. Moreover, specialisation is the 
effect of higher foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows and trade in the sector 
(intra-industry trade). Behar – Freund (2011) examined how fragmentation of 
production in Europe has changed and developed, and discussed how integration 
has facilitated the volume and increasing complexity of intra-EU trade in inter-
mediate products. Amador et al. (2013) and Altomonte et al. (2012) also proved 
that CEE nations are an important part of the trade in intermediate goods. How-
ever, there has been a slight drop in this trade. Marin (2006) examined German 
and Austrian investments in CEE countries to present a pattern of intra-company 
trade and the emergence of selected Eastern European nations in the international 
fragmentation of production.
More detailed surveys that focus on selected sectors of CEE economies can 
be found. Kaminski – Ng (2001, 2005) investigated the trade networks. They 
emphasised that the growth of specialisation in manufacturing was an important 
driver of the economic growth of many transitional CEE states. They showed that 
these production linkages underwent significant transition: a shift from labour-
intensive simple assembly operations to processing and local production of parts, 
and an expansion beyond EU markets. Moreover, they presented the integration 
of CEE countries into EU production networks in three sectors especially: furni-
ture (which is characteristic of almost all economies analysed), automotives (the 
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Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia), and sectors experi-
encing the “information revolution” (Estonia and Hungary). Similar results were 
presented by Timmer et al. (2012). They analysed nations specialising mainly 
in electronics (Hungary, Slovakia), machinery (Czech Republic, Slovakia), and 
transport equipment (all states), and demonstrated that the CEE region increased 
its proportion of income from participation in global value chains in Europe from 
4.4% in 1995 to 9.3% in 2008, with a continuous growth in the number of high-
skilled workers involved in production processes. The same tendency was shown 
by Pavlinek (2005) and Jürgens – Krzywdzinski (2009). They indicated that the 
CEE region is a production hub for European automotive producers with global 
suppliers, near enough to Western Europe to supply parts on a just-in-time basis. 
Similar results were found in Backer’s and Miroudot’s survey (2013). In turn, 
Simkova (2013) pointed out the sectors in CEE states which were on the whole in-
tegrated into Global Value Chains (GVCs). In addition to the automotive industry 
(almost all analysed nations), there was electrical engineering (Poland, Slovakia) 
and mechanical engineering (Poland, Czech Republic, and Bulgaria). Labrianidis 
et al. (2008) examined the electronics sector and showed that in Europe, the past 
two decades have seen a deepening of integration that has been paralleled by shift-
ing production capacity from Western Europe to post-socialist states. De Simone 
(2008), in turn, used trade in parts and components as an independent variable to 
determine changes in the industrial geography of the EU-15 and CEE states. Ac-
cording to his results, the contribution of imported intermediates is positive and 
substantial in the “automotive sector and office machinery” industries. In these 
two sectors, higher levels of imports of intermediate products go with a higher 
relative proportion of sectoral production. Akbar – Ferencikova (2007) also dis-
covered from their questionnaire-based research that most suppliers in the auto-
motive sector in Slovakia were second-tier, producing mainly standardised parts 
for global first-tier suppliers. Sass – Szalavetz (2013) in turn analysed the effects 
of the crisis on GVC for integrated Hungarian automotive and electronic indus-
tries. According to their results, companies have had functional upgrading effects 
caused by the global crisis and the reorganisation of corporations. More detailed 
case studies have presented an ongoing industrial upgrading in the CEE region 
generally. Whereas early participation in a GVC concentrated mainly on assem-
bly operations, tasks of higher complexity are increasingly being performed and 
the new EU members have become important suppliers of products and parts. 
The global crisis induced certain positive effects on GVCs in CEE countries. 
Recently, however, some surveys have shown that because most strategic deci-
sions regarding industrial location are being made in Western Europe, further 
upgrading in GVCs might be very difficult to achieve (Jacoby 2010; Fortwengel 
2011). According to Stehrer et al. (2012b), Central, Eastern and Southeastern EU 
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members appear to be the most interlinked, exhibiting strong bilateral linkages 
with EU-15 members. 
In sum, according to numerous surveys, CEE states are found lower down the 
value chain networks. Nevertheless, they do not have an obvious specialisation 
in regard to labour-intensive or low-skill undertakings. CEE countries are found 
in relatively downstream activities of global production chains; acquired technol-
ogy, capital, and know-how have underpinned the expansion and competitiveness 
of their exports. Climbing the GVC into knowledge-intensive production is a 
prime concern. Nevertheless, we should be aware that post-socialist states face 
strong competition from Asian countries, especially from China, that are deter-
mined to rise up the manufacturing value chain and are developing capabilities in 
knowledge-intensive manufacturing (Cieślik 2014b, 2015).
2. METHODOLOGY
With contemporary international production chains, value added (VA) has its ori-
gins in many locations. Specifying these sources and trying to measure their con-
tribution to exports is crucial for a number of research and policy questions, but 
the existing measures are mostly unsatisfactory. The “HIY” method, proposed by 
Hummels et al. (2001), provided the first empirical measure of participation in 
vertically specialised trade.1
If we want to reflect foreign content in exports, the HIY measure requires two 
main assumptions: (a) first, all imported intermediate inputs must contain 100% 
foreign VA and no more than one country can export intermediates; (b) second, 
intensity in the use of imported inputs is assumed to be the same, irrespective of 
whether goods are produced for export or for domestic consumption.
We assume that we have a two-country (one home, one foreign) world, in 
which each country produces goods in N-differentiated tradable sectors. Goods 
in each sector can be consumed directly or used as intermediate inputs. Moreover, 
each country exports both intermediate and final goods to the other. 
The entire gross output produced by country r must be used as an intermediate 
good or a final good at home or abroad, or
 Xr = ArrXr + ArsXs + Yrr  +Yrs’                    r, s = 1,2 (1)
1  However, their measure of foreign value in exports is valid only in a special case; they did not 
mathematically define their measure of indirect value-added exports through third countries; 
and these two measures do not capture all sources of VA in gross exports (Koopman et al. 
2010).
470 EWA CIEŚLIK – JADWIGA BIEGAŃSKA – STEFANIA ŚRODA-MURAWSKA
Acta Oeconomica 66 (2016)
where Xr is the N×1 gross output vector of a country r; Yrs is the N×1 final de-
mand vector that gives demand in country s for final goods produced in r; Ars is 
the N×N IO coefficient matrix, giving intermediate use in s of goods produced 
in r. 
The two-country production and trade system can be written as an ICIO model 
in block matrix notation as follows:
  (2)
and rearranged,
  (3)
where Bsr denotes the N×N block Leontief inverse matrix, which is the total re-
quirement matrix that gives the amount of gross output in producing country s 
required for a one-unit increase in final demand in country r. 
Yr is a 2N×1 vector that gives the global use of r’s final goods. 
This can be expressed succinctly as:
  (4)
where X and Y are 2N×1 vectors, and A and B are 2N×2N matrices.
Having defined the Leontief inverse matrix, we turn to measures of domestic 
and foreign content (first for production, and then applied to trade). 
We agree that:
Vs will be the 1×N direct VA coefficient vector and each element of Vs gives the 
share of direct domestic VA in total output. This amounts to one minus the inter-
mediate input share from all countries:
  (5)
where u is a 1×N unity vector. To be consistent with the “multiple-country” dis-
cussion below, we should also define V, the 2×2N matrix of direct domestic VA 
for both countries,
  (6)
Combining these direct VA shares with the Leontief inverse matrices produces 
the 2×2N VA share (VAS) matrix, our main measure of VA shares by source.
1 11 12 1 11 12
2 21 22 2 21 22
X A A X Y Y
X A A X Y Y
                      
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2 21 22 21 22 21 22 2
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X A I A Y Y B B Y
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(7)
Within VAS, each column of V1B11 denotes domestic VA share of domestically 
produced products in a particular sector at home. Similarly, the columns of V2B21 
denote the share of “country 2’s” VA in these same goods. Each of the first N 
columns in the VAS matrix includes all VA, domestic and foreign, required to 
produce one additional unit of domestic product at home. The second N columns 
present VA shares for production in “country 2”. All VA must be either domestic 
or foreign, hence the sum down each column is unity:
  (8)
The VAS matrix contains all the necessary information to separate domestic 
and imported content in the production and trade of a particular country at a sec-
toral level. Either exports of final goods or total gross exports could be used as 
“weights” to assess these proportions when aggregation is necessary. In order to 
compare other measures of vertical specialisation, and to link our measures with 
official trade statistics, we use gross exports. Let Ers be the N×1 vector of gross 
exports from r to s. For consistency with the “multiple country” analysis below, 
we will define
  (9)
  (10)
and
  (11)
where E is a 2N×2 matrix and Ê is a 2N×2N diagonal matrix.
The combination of the VA share matrix and an export matrix as weights pro-
duces a 2×2N matrix VAS_ Ê , our sectoral measure of VA share by source coun-
try:
  (12)
2
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The elements of this matrix provide disaggregated VA by source in gross ex-
ports for each sector. It is important to add that this measure captures all upstream 
sector contributions to VA within a specific sector’s gross exports. 
Domestic/foreign content of exports and VA exports, if we consider them as 
related, are different concepts. However, both concepts measure the value gen-
erated by factors used in the producing country, domestic content of exports is 
independent of where that value is employed. By contrast, VA trade depends on 
how a country’s exports are used by importers. It is VA produced by one country, 
but absorbed by another. Therefore, equation (12) shows related measures of do-
mestic/foreign content in sector level gross exports, not sector level VA exports. 
Because the later matrix (after zeroing its diagonal):
  (13)
depends on where the VA is absorbed, it has to be defined in the context of final 
demand, where Ysr is an N by 1 vector; Y is 2N by 2 final demand matrix; V̂r is a 
N by N diagonal matrix with direct VA coefficients along the diagonal and has 
different dimension with V matrix defined earlier. 
The resulting VȂT is a 2N by 2 VA production matrix, its diagonal elements 
give each country’s production of VA absorbed by itself, while its off-diagonal 
elements constitute the 2N by 2 bilateral VA trade matrix. The VA trade matrix is 
the off-diagonal element of VȂT, therefore, it excludes VA produced in the home 
country that returns home after processing abroad.
To illustrate these two major concepts and their relations in the simplest pos-
sible way, we will aggregate the version throughout the rest of this section. The 
aggregate (2×2) measure of VA by source in gross exports is given by
  (14)
Although rather elementary with only two countries, VAS_E shows the ma-
jor concepts of new VA by source measure. Additionally, diagonal elements of 
VAS_E define the domestic VA in each country’s exports and off-diagonal ele-
ments give the foreign VA embodied in each country’s exports.
In the two-country case, explicit solutions for the four Brs block matrices are 
not too difficult, and enable us to demonstrate why HIY’s vertical specialisation 
measures are a special case of new general measures. Applying the algebra of the 
partitioned matrix inverse, we have 
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
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(15)
 
Therefore, gross exports can be decomposed into foreign VA (or VS, following 
the HIY notation) and domestic VA (DV) in the following way:
  (16)
 1 1 12 21 1* 21 12 22 21 11 12 22 21 1*
1 1 1
1 12 2* 12 21 11 12 22 21 11 12 2*
( ( ) )( ( ) )
.
( ( ) )( ( ) )
V B E u A A I A A I A A I A A E
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V B E u A A I A A I A A I A A E
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  
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  (17)
They are both 2×1 matrices.
Using the same notation, the HIY measure of foreign VA can be shown as 
another 2×1 matrix:
  (18)
Comparing equations (17) and (18), we can note that the HIY measure only 
captures foreign VA in gross exports when either A12 = 0 or A21 = 0, i.e. in the case 
when only one country’s intermediate goods are used abroad. The new measure 
captures an important element omitted from HIY’s formula. For the home country, 
both domestic and foreign VA varies from its true value by 112 22 21 21( ) .A I A A E
  
Thus the new measure can account for a country importing its own VA which 
has been exported but returns home after being processed abroad. In a general 
context, VAS_E will attribute foreign and domestic content to multiple countries 
in an appropriate way when intermediate products cross borders in even more 
complicated patterns. 
The second HIY measure of vertical specialisation (labelled as VS1 by HIY) 
details domestic VA in inputs exported indirectly to third countries. In a two-
country world, the home country’s IV (indirectly exported VA) is identical to the 
foreign country’s FV:
 IV1 = V1B12E21. (19)
By using the decomposition results at a country-sector level, we can construct 
an index that helps us to assess if a country is likely to be upstream or down-
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stream in the GVC in any sector. We can also construct a separate index that helps 
us to assess the extent to which such a country-sector is involved in the global 
production chain.
For an index to capture a country’s position (i.e. upstream or downstream), it is 
possible to compare that country’s exports of intermediates in that sector that are 
used by other countries, with that country’s use of imported intermediates in the 
same sector. If a country lies upstream in the GVC, it produces inputs for others, 
either by providing raw materials (such as Russia), or by providing manufactured 
intermediates (such as Japan), or both. For such a country, its indirect VA (IV) 
share in gross exports will be higher than its FV share. Comparing this with a 
country which lies downstream in a GVC, we can observe that it will use a large 
portion of other countries’ intermediates to produce final goods for export, and its 
FV share will be higher than its IV share.
We define a “country-sector” index for the position in a GVC as the log ratio 
of a country-sector’s supply of intermediates used in other countries’ exports to 
the use of imported intermediates in its own production.
 
If the country-sector lies upstream in a supply chain, the numerator tends to be 
large. On the other hand, if it lies downstream, then the denominator tends to be 
large. 
Of course, two countries can have the same GVC position index in one sector 
while having very different levels of participation in GVCs. Therefore, the posi-
tion index must be used in conjunction with another index that summarises the 
significance of the global supply chain for that country-sector. Finally, we define 
a GVC participation index as  
 
If a country is located in the upstream segment in a production value chain 
(first stages of production), it is likely that it has a high level of forward partici-
pation relative to backward. This means that the country relies more on its own 
production. If a country specialises in the final stages of production (downstream 
segment), it is likely that it imports a lot of intermediate goods from abroad and 
therefore it has high level of backward participation. The GVC position index 
is constructed in such a way that states with high forward relative to backward 
participation have a value above zero. A more general approach indicates that 
upstream economies produce the raw materials or knowledge assets at the begin-
_ (1 ) (1 )ir irir
ir ir
IV FVGVC Position Ln Ln
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ning of the production process (e.g. R&D or design tend to create more VA than 
assembly does), while downstream economies assemble processed products or 
specialise in customer services.
3. THE ROLE OF POST-SOCIALIST COUNTRIES 
IN GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS
Because of the transition processes and growing integration between post-so-
cialist economies and EU markets, CEE countries entered GVCs (Dicken et al. 
2011). The liberalisation of trade and investment linkages between the EU-15 
and the new member states, as well as their role in GVCs, had a major effect on 
the shape of international economic relations in the region. The commodity and 
geographical patterns of foreign trade in post-socialist countries was transformed 
by production delocation and fragmentation processes occurring in the last years 
of the sample period. 
Development of CEE countries encouraged EU-based firms to shift their pro-
duction to post-socialist states in order reduce their production costs, particularly 
the cost of labour, and to exploit the comparative advantages of CEE countries 
(efficiency-seeking investments). The compensation for the considerably lower 
productivity of labour in post-socialist countries compared with the EU-152 was 
to be hourly pay below the euro zone average.3 Because of lower costs, a rela-
tively good infrastructure, and progressing liberalisation and integration with the 
EU, post-socialist countries received massive inflows of investments onto green-
field sites from Western Europe. Following the relocation of production, new fac-
tories were constructed.4 Asian and US firms found that post-socialist countries 
as a gateway to more developed markets in the EU made investments as well 
(Cieślik 2012).5 For many investors, the markets of the new member countries in 
themselves were sufficient and very attractive locations for their FDI. The prior-
2  For instance, in 2005, labour productivity in Poland was 56% of that in the EU-15; in the 
Czech Republic it was 66%, in Hungary 61%, but in Bulgaria only 32%. By 2012, the rates 
had slightly increased to 67% in Poland and to 67%, 65%, and 43% in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Bulgaria, respectively (Eurostat 2014).
3  In 2012, the average hourly pay in the EU-15 was €38.6; in Poland it was €10.4, in the Czech 
Republic €13.3, in Hungary €11.4, and in Bulgaria €5. The highest average rate was paid in 
Slovenia: €20.1 (Eurostat 2014).
4 The first post-socialist economy that admitted foreign capital for privatisation was Hungary.
5  Non-European corporations had different goals than those in the EU, though. The main reason 
for their investments in post-socialist countries was not the wish to gain access to local mar-
kets, but to avoid customs restrictions and to have easier access to the European Single Market 
(Ambroziak 2013).
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ity targets for foreign investors were Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary.6 
Foreign investments ultimately caused the internationalisation of production in 
post-socialist countries, incorporated them into GVCs, and led to a new division 
of labour in Europe (Błasiak 2013).
The international fragmentation of production gave a boost to industries in 
post-socialist economies that had comparative advantages (Feenstra 1998). In-
creased internationalisation and fragmentation of production might imply that 
an economy which uses potential comparative advantages, due to sourcing from 
other countries, having a comparative advantage in other stages of production 
or producing intermediate goods more cheaply than domestically might gain in 
competitiveness in some sectors, leading to better growth performance in terms 
of output or VA. Whether this is also the case for employment is a trickier ques-
tion, as offshoring often has a similar effect on labour-saving technical progress, 
though the overall increase in output might compensate for that (Foster et al. 
2013). Even though the speed of joining globalisation was quite high, interna-
tional competitiveness remained relatively low. The most successful was Estonia, 
which in 2012 was ranked 34th in the World Economic Forum ranking of 144 
countries. Poland and the Czech Republic were respectively 41st and 42nd (World 
Economic Forum 2013).
In attempting to determine a country’s position within GVCs, serious meth-
odological problems and challenges must be overcome. This is partly caused by 
the non-existence of a standard method for measuring VA and by the lack of 
availability of relatively new data on VA flows in international trade. Therefore, 
to find out where post-socialist countries are on the value chain map, it is nec-
essary to analyse VA in their trade. The first indication that a country may be 
entering a GVC is a decreasing share of domestic VA in its gross exports, imply-
ing a larger proportion of foreign VA and stronger linkages within GVCs. The 
countries analysed showed different trends in this respect. Generally, because of 
the proportion of domestic VA in gross exports, all of them were below the EU 
average. This proportion slightly decreased between 2000 and 2012 in four coun-
tries only (Czech Republic, Poland, Latvia, and Lithuania), thus indicating an 
expanding share of foreign VA (Graph 1). The case of the Hungarian and Czech 
automotive industries shows, however, that this simplified analysis does not al-
low a country’s position in a GVC to be established. According to FDI flows, the 
automotive industry was the main beneficiary of foreign funds in both countries 
in the last years of the sample period, which proves its strong internationalisation 
6  At the end of 2012, Poland accounted for over 29% of accumulated foreign direct investment 
in post-socialist countries, the Czech Republic for almost 16%, Hungary for over 14%, and 
Romania for more than 11% (UNCTAD 2013).
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and integration with global production. This explicit conclusion cannot be drawn 
from the analysis of the share of domestic VA, which increased between 2000 and 
2009 in both Hungary and the Czech Republic (OECD 2014).
Foreign VA as a part of the exports of post-socialist countries mostly comes 
from the EU-15. In other words, a large proportion of exports are integrated with-
in EU value chains. This relationship is particularly clear in Slovakia, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic, where over 40% of foreign VA in exports originates 
from the EU-15. In the Baltic States, particularly in Lithuania, linkages with EU 
value chains are much weaker than with value chains in Russia and Asia (OECD 
2014).
An important indicator of a country’s position in a GVC is the share of inter-
mediate imports that are directly or indirectly used to export goods and services. 
In the exports of post-socialist countries, the proportion of intermediate imports 
is much greater than in the US or Japan. In 2009, it was highest in Slovakia 
(almost 70%; the Polish rate was below 45%). The intermediate import propor-
tion of goods and services exports slightly increased in the analysed countries 
between 2000 and 2009, implying a slight decline in the production of high-tech 
products (Feenstra – Hanson 1999) (Graph 2). 
Because of foreign investors’ preference for automotive industries in post-
socialist countries (the electronics sector was also frequently targeted in the later 
years of the sample), an analysis of the share of foreign VA in these sectors may 
Graph 1. Domestic VA as a proportion of gross exports in post-socialist countries and the EU 
(2000, 2009, %)
Source: Based on TiVA OECD-WTO data (https://stats.oecd.org).
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provide interesting information (Table 1). In the Slovakian, Hungarian, and Czech 
transport equipment sectors, particularly in the automotive industries, the propor-
tion is high because large automotive companies have their factories there (Mi-
hályi 2001). All three have considerable proportions of foreign VA in electron-
ics exports, as well as higher indices for the number of international production 
stages for both industries (significantly exceeding the EU average). This points 
to the strong internationalisation of these industries and their reliance on foreign 
inputs, which translates into strong linkages with global value chains (Graph 3, 
Table 2).
Graph 2. Intermediate imports as a proportion of goods and services exports in selected countries 
(2000, 2005, 2009)
Source: Based on TiVA OECD-WTO data (https://stats.oecd.org).
Table 1. Inward FDI stocks in the electronics and transport equipment sectors 
in selected post-socialist countries (2011, %)
Electronics Transport equipment
Slovakia 4.2 17.3
Hungary 17.1 19.5*
Czech Republic 1.8 65.5
Slovenia 0.2 7.6
Poland 2.9 15.0
Estonia 5.4 4.3
* 2010
Source: Calculated from OECD data (2014). 
FOREIGN TRADE AND GLOBAL VALUE CHAINS 479
Acta Oeconomica 66 (2016)
A more comprehensive approach to determining a post-socialist country’s par-
ticipation in a GVC consists of two stages. First, VA embodied in the country’s 
domestic gross exports is decomposed. Second, foreign VA contained in its gross 
domestic exports and domestic value added to the exports of the country’s trad-
ing partners are calculated (Koopman et al. 2010). Both indicators show whether 
Graph 3. Proportions of foreign VA in the major recipient sectors of FDI in selected countries 
(2000, 2009, %)
Source: Based on TiVA OECD-WTO data (https://stats.oecd.org).
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a country is climbing up or down a value chain. An increasing share of domestic 
VA in the exports of trading partners points to an upstream movement. An in-
creasing share of foreign VA in a country’s total exports is indicative of a down-
ward movement.
For the purposes of this study, value added was decomposed for post-socialist 
countries as well as for the USA, Japan, and China, major links in GVCs. In 
comparing post-socialist countries to the world’s largest economies, some de-
gree of caution is necessary because the latter are relatively self-sufficient, so the 
proportion of foreign VA in their exports is much lower than in smaller countries 
with less developed internal markets. An analysis showed post-socialist countries 
differing significantly regarding the proportions of foreign VA contained in their 
exports. In 2009, proportions were highest and lowest in Slovakia and Romania, 
respectively (<44% and 24%), but all post-socialist countries were below the 
EU average or had lower proportions than in the USA and Japan. For the sake of 
comparison, the proportions of domestic VA in their trading partners’ exports fol-
Table 2. Stages in the production of transport equipment and electronics in selected countries 
(2000, 2009)
Transport equipment Electronics
Index of the 
number of 
international 
production stages
Index of the 
number of 
domestic 
production stages
Index of the 
number of 
international 
production stages
Index of the 
number of 
domestic 
production stages
2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009 2000 2009
Slovakia 1.8 1.6 1.2 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.5
Hungary 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.3 1.4
Czech Republic 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.2
Slovenia 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.4 1 1 1.4 1.4
Latvia 0.9 1 1.6 1.5 1.7 1.1 1.1 1.3
Poland 0.8 1 1.6 1.7 0.6 0.8 2.5 2.7
Estonia 0.8 0.8 1.4 1.5 1 1 1.3 1.3
Lithuania 0.6 0.7 1.3 1.4 6 0.7 1.5 1.4
Romania 0.7 0.6 1.6 1.5 0.5 0.6 1.6 1.7
Bulgaria 0.9 0.8 1.5 1.9 1 0.9 1.4 1.7
Germany 0.7 0.8 1.9 2 0.9 1 1.5 1.4
China 0.4 0.5 2.8 3.1 0.3 0.9 1.7 1.6
USA 0.5 0.5 2 1.8 0.3 0.4 2.1 2.1
Japan 0.2 0.3 2.7 2.6 0.1 0.3 1.5 1.5
EU 0.3 0.3 2.3 2.4 0.3 0.4 2 2
Note: An index value approaching zero means that more components are made domestically. Moving away 
from zero the industry’s dependence on foreign inputs increases.
Source: Based on TiVA OECD-WTO data (https://stats.oecd.org).
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lowed an upward trend. In 2009, they exceeded the EU average in most countries 
including Poland, but were still lower than in the USA or Japan (particularly high 
proportions were recorded in 2009 in Latvia and the Czech Republic, respectively 
29.8% and 22.2%). Post-socialist countries have high rates of GVC participation 
that is important for their economies (Table 3). 
The above results point to the presence of two-way linkages in the vertical 
specialisations of post-socialist countries. On the one hand, they have a stronger 
Table 3. Participation in GVCs (2000, 2009)
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Czech 
Republic
39.18 39.39 22.2 23.0 61.38 62.39 25.80 0.57 0.58
Estonia 50.06 33.22 18.7 21.3 68.76 54.52 24.85 0.37 0.64
Hungary 46.19 39.91 17.2 18.7 63.39 58.61 25.40 0.37 0.47
Poland 23.33 27.89 24.1 20.5 47.43 48.39 10.84 1.03 0.74
Slovakia 48.26 44.35 21.2 17.9 69.46 62.25 30.77 0.44 0.4
Slovenia 37.52 34.40 20.6 18.2 58.12 52.60 26.15 0.55 0.53
Bulgaria 38.13 32.14 20.2 15.7 58.33 47.84 15.35 0.53 0.49
Latvia 24.62 25.18 29.8 24.3 54.42 49.48 10.69 1.21 0.96
Lithuania 32.56 36.05 17.7 14.1 50.26 50.15 26.00 0.54 0.39
Romania 27.39 24.18 20.8 21.9 48.19 46.08 13.32 0.76 0.91
EU-27 12.63 13.62 18.0 17.8 30.63 31.42 4.29 1.43 1.31
China 18.81 32.63 13.8 13.4 32.61 46.03 11.84 0.73 0.41
Germany 24.40 26.64 24.4 22.8 48.80 49.44 17.34 1 0.86
USA 8.88 11.29 31.1 28.5 39.98 39.79 4.02 3.5 2.52
Japan 9.91 14.79 26.1 33.0 36.01 47.79 5.87 2.63 2.23
Notes: Owing to a lack of more recent data, the last calculations were made for 2009.
Domestic VA in trading partners’ exports was calculated using OECD-WTO indicators of participation.
The level of a country’s participation in GVCs is established by adding domestic VA in the exports of its trading 
partners to foreign VA in its gross exports.
Source: Calculated on TiVA OECD-WTO data (https://stats.oecd.org).
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presence in the downstream segment of GVCs compared with developed coun-
tries, meaning that they import foreign VA for the purposes of domestic exports. 
On the other hand, the foreign export share of VA originating in these countries 
is close to the EU average; this shows that they are gradually leaving behind 
countries outside the EU in the upstream segment of GVCs. In technologically 
advanced GVCs, post-socialist countries are ranked below developed countries. 
An indicator of a country’s relative position in GVCs shows greater strength of 
the downstream linkages. The higher its value, the higher the position a country 
has in the upstream segment with “one” as a threshold value dividing a GVC into 
downstream and upstream segments. The indicator showed post-socialist coun-
tries to be positioned in GVCs below the USA and Japan, and even below the EU 
average. In 2000, Latvia was the only country present in the upstream segment 
and Poland was on the threshold between segments, but the positions of both 
countries had worsened by 2009. The same trend affected most post-socialist 
countries except for the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Hungary, which had slight-
ly improved their positions (Table 3). 
Being the key trading partner of most post-socialist countries, Germany should 
be analysed in more detail. Its exports have a relatively high content of foreign 
VA, participation in GVCs is important for its economy, and the intermediate im-
port share of domestic exports considerably exceeds levels recorded in other de-
veloped countries. Post-socialist countries and Germany strengthened their trade 
linkages in the 1990s. In Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, 
trade volumes with Germany expanded particularly fast, the main reason being 
the special role of Germany as an intermediary facilitating access to intermediate 
goods (accounting for almost half of the trade between Germany and Poland). 
Vertical integration between post-socialist countries and Germany is particularly 
clear for more advanced products, primarily transport equipment. The strength 
of linkages between them is determined not only by different skills and costs of 
labour, but also by economic and cultural similarities, and geographical proxim-
ity (IMF 2013).
Post-socialist countries can also be considered in terms of their position in 
GVCs related to a particular industry. This part of the analysis focuses on indus-
tries that have achieved the highest level of internationalisation: transport equip-
ment and electronics. As far as the production of transport equipment is con-
cerned, five post-socialist countries (including Poland) were among the global 
leaders in the upstream segment. A special role in the later years of the sample 
was played by the automotive industry not only boosting the countries’ exports, 
but also attracting major foreign investors. The automotive industry in the Baltic 
States, Slovenia, and Bulgaria has a shorter history, hence their lower positions in 
respective GVCs. Because electronic products are the traditional domain of the 
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“Asian tigers”, post-socialist countries occupy positions lower down the electron-
ics supply chains. The highest positions were attained by Hungary and the Czech 
Republic; Poland was in the upstream segment too, but far behind the value chain 
leaders (Diagram 1).
Diagram 1. The positions of post-socialist and selected other countries in GVCs in the transport 
equipment and electronics sectors (2009)
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Note: The diagram contains countries for which OECD-WTO statistics are available. GVCs were constructed 
using relative positions in particular sectors of industry.
Source: Calculated on TiVA OECD-WTO data (https://stats.oecd.org).
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4. CONCLUSIONS
The European post-socialist countries have significantly improved their economic 
systems in the last two decades and redirected their trade from the former Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance members to EU markets. In almost all of them, 
trade patterns increasingly resemble those in the EU. 
Post-socialist countries’ integration with the EU and the adoption of its trading 
rules has brought measurable benefits such as a fast expanding volume of trade, 
particularly in the first years after accession. However, the recent international 
economic crisis has not only partly reduced trading profits, but also showed the 
weak points of European integration, such as a lower volume of trade with non-
EU countries in Asia and Africa.
Strengthening integration gave post-socialist markets an opportunity to join 
regional value chains,7 while their trade and capital linkages with the EU-15 grew 
stronger too, particularly in high technology sectors. Their decision to join the EU 
can be rightly perceived as a major move intended to spur their development and 
bring them closer to the EU-15, but it also made them more sensitive to industrial 
and demand shocks coming from the euro zone. Although the recent global crisis 
quickly exposed the weaknesses of integration with the EU, its present model 
is not likely to change, particularly regarding participation in GVCs. It is quite 
possible, however, that integration in foreign trade will not be at the same level 
as today. 
The analysis of post-socialist countries’ positions in global value chains leads 
to the following conclusions. Firstly, countries have different GVC participation 
rates, and those of them that closely cooperate with Western European countries, 
especially with Germany, are more integrated with GVCs. Secondly, a consider-
able proportion of post-socialist exports go through Western European GVCs. 
Thirdly, most exporters in Central and Eastern Europe have lower positions in 
value chains. 
The limitations of this study are due to the limited availability of statistical 
data, the most recent of which were generated in 2009. Because the GVCs were 
analysed using data ending in 2009, after which negative trends appeared in trade 
with most EU countries, including CEE, future studies into the role of post-so-
cialist countries in GVCs should be extended beyond 2009. It is quite possible 
that the new data will rank the countries differently.
7  One indication that the process is taking place is the similar rates of economic growth between 
the eurozone and post-socialist countries.
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